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Private Military Contractors, 
Security Forces, and Mercenaries
Naomi Pearson
The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death, a road 
either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account 
be neglected.  
  -    Sun Tzu, The Art of WarWarfare changes as the result of advances in technology and weaponry, re-visions to the concept of national sovereignty, and the development of human rights law. In recent years, billions of dollars in the global econ-
omy have been funnelled into the production of new war technologies such as ma-
chine guns, light armoured vehicles, missiles, and drones. In fact, $1,776,000,0001 
of the global economy was spent on military expenditure in 2014 alone (SIPRI 1-8). 
Changes in warfare, however, do not reside simply in the advancement of steel, gun-
powder, and pressure switches; war can be shaped by the organization and classifi-
cation of those individuals fighting it. The recruitment and hiring of private military 
contractors (PMCs) by governments, powerful companies, and wealthy individuals 
is one recent shift in the dynamics of warfare (Scahill 42-48). Private military con-
tracting has increased the danger to civilians within conflicts through the ambiguity 
in which PMCs operate, the lack of traditional military discipline within their ranks, 
and the manipulation of the jurisdictional holes that currently exist in International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL). Focusing on the United States’ implementation of Amer-
ican contracting companies in the Iraq and Afghan wars, this article will investigate 
international treaties and laws that limit the use of PMCs.
I. The Ambiguous Armed-Force       
 PMCs are companies that perform tasks that have traditionally been execut-
ed by the military of a sovereign nation (Singer, “Superpower for Hire”). Contracts 
are granted to companies that specialize in a range of areas, including information 
technologies, food services, language and speech translation, construction, and pro-
1 All dollar figures in this article refer to American currency.
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viding security and operational support for combat missions. This article will fo-
cus on those who are employed in and around combat roles. PMCs often work out-
side of the protected safe zone of a military instillation in order to perform duties as 
bodyguards and escorts for high-ranking political officials and wealthy CEOs. PMCs 
also frequently assist in combat operations by providing operational and logistical 
support, gathering intelligence, and training military and civilian personnel (DCAF 
1-7). 
 The private military industry experienced a boost from the interest of the 
United States Department of Defence in the late 1990s. This unprecedented growth 
had ties to the so-called Rumsfeld Doctrine – a doctrine that re-envisioned the use of 
the American military and its budget (Klein 283-298). The Rumsfeld Doctrine was 
intended to counter the Powell Doctrine which called for the American military to 
operate as an overwhelming force of operational ‘boots on the ground’ soldiers. The 
Powell Doctrine asserted a view of military strength that relied on numbers, where-
as Rumsfeld’s approach stressed that the United States’ military prowess came from 
its elite technology. The Rumsfeld Doctrine was novel because it required (at least 
theoretically) significantly fewer foot soldiers to achieve victory (Korb, “Rumsfeld’s 
Folly”). The Rumsfeld Doctrine was created in connection with a neoliberal push for 
privatization and outsourcing within the American government, and was supported 
by the economics of Milton Friedman. While less American soldiers were enlisted in 
this neoliberal economy, privatized military positions would soon be in high demand 
(Klein 283-298). In many ways, the outsourcing of military roles to PMCs in Iraq was 
what distinguished contracting companies from mercenaries. Fitting PMC contracts 
into Friedman’s model of privatization legitimized an otherwise illegal practice by 
officially aligning it with the economic and defence policies of the United States (Et-
tinger 744-745).
 While the scope and magnitude of subcontracting in Iraq was substantial, 
it was largely unreported to the American public. By 2007, there were more PMCs 
hired by the United States than there were government soldiers serving in Iraq. 
Though hired by the United States, these contractors came from numerous countries 
all over the world; it is estimated that contractors in Iraq came from as many as 100 
different countries and over 630 different contracting companies (Scahill 48). This 
diversity is a potential source for concern in combat situations because it calls into 
question the allegiances of those engaged in combat. In a national army, soldiers 
fight for their state: their loyalties are to their government, monarch, or country. 
With PMCs, which often include members from several different sovereign nations, 
soldiers are primarily concerned with monetary gain (Kidane 361-365). 
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 Over the past two decades, the United States government has spent the most 
of any nation on the PMC industry. During the Iraq war, spending on contracts grew 
from $50 million in 2003 to $613 million in 2006 – an increase of $563 million in 
just three years (Scahill 45). The private military industry is also a growing sector 
that continues to see increased revenues and investment. Current estimates place the 
global value of private military contracts in 2014 to be roughly $218 billion (Thomas, 
“Superpower for Hire”2).  Despite these large expenditures, many nations are not 
required to report on their activities with PMCs. For instance, the United States kept 
their involvement with PMCs in Iraq quiet due to the fact that no one government 
body was legally required to report the deaths of contractors during the war (Isen-
berg, “Undercounting”). It still remains unclear just how many civilian contractors 
were killed during the War in Iraq, though it is estimated to be over 400 casualties. 
The reason for the lack of accountability is that no central agency was responsible for 
recording PMC casualties, whether American or foreign national (Isenberg, “Under-
counting”). Therefore, it still remains difficult to determine the exact number of PMC 
casualties.
II. The Dangers of Indiscipline    
 Discipline is essential for the control of military personnel and attaining vic-
tory on the battlefield. During war, commanders find it necessary that their soldiers 
are disciplined enough to stand their ground and defend those fighting alongside 
them. Otherwise, the military cannot function as a cohesive unit; the chain of com-
mand will break down and disorder will ensue (Tzu 86). French philosopher and his-
torian Michel Foucault offers a discussion of the concept ‘discipline’ in his analysis of 
seventeenth and eighteenth century European warfare. He argues that the construc-
tion of military and state power transformed what it meant to be a soldier. According 
to Foucault, the seventeenth century soldier was brightly dressed, recognizable for 
‘traditional’ battlefield combat, and carried himself with a sense of individualistic 
identity (Godfrey, Lilley, and Brewis 553-554). In contrast with the seventeenth cen-
tury soldier, Foucault claims that:    
[b]y the late eighteenth century, the soldier has become something that can 
be made; out of a formless clay, an inapt body, the machine required can 
be constructed; posture is gradually corrected; a calculated constraint runs 
slowly through each part of the body,  mastering it, making it pliable, ready
 
2 Since there are few restrictive regulations or methods that monitor PMC contracts, it should 
be noted that these figures are only a rough approximation.
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at all times, turning silently into the automatism of habit. (qtd. in Godfrey, 
Lilley, and Brewis 553-554) 
Foucault’s commentary on discipline speaks to the changing nature of modern mili-
tary structures. Without effective discipline, the United States military is not able to 
function effectively. It is through discipline that the United States is able to turn out 
highly skilled soldiers who are loyal to their state and who identify with a common 
brotherhood, rather than focusing on their own individual needs (54). During the 
war in Iraq, however, a breakdown of discipline occurred in many areas when private 
contractors were hired to do the work of the military. Though many privately con-
tracted soldiers were previously enlisted in the military, they were no longer forced 
to subscribe to the chain of command. Military discipline and ethical codes were no 
longer explicitly forced upon privately contracted soldiers on the battlefield or while 
off duty. 
 There are several occasions where lack of discipline proved fatal, both for 
PMCs and local civilian populations. In 2004, a group of civilian contractors working 
for Blackwater Worldwide Co. was killed when the plane they were flying crashed 
into the Afghan mountains (Wald, “2004 Crash”). Though they were contracted by 
the United States government to deliver mortar shells from Bagram Air base, the 
craft they were flying was not military grade – it was a standard civilian air taxi. A 
2005 investigative report conducted by the United States military notes that the acci-
dent occurred due to a lack of proper in-country training by Blackwater. Moreover, 
the flight recorder revealed that the pilots were unfamiliar with their flight path. It 
was later found that neither military, nor Federal Aviation Administration standards 
were observed during the flight. No one onboard was wearing the required oxygen 
masks for the plane’s unpressurized cabin. The victims’ families and numerous re-
view boards argued that the accident would not have occurred if the military been 
in control of the flight (Wald, “2004 Crash”). They claimed that the strict safety stan-
dards under which government military pilots and flight crews are forced to operate 
could have reduced the likelihood of this tragedy. 
 That same year, international news headlines were made when four Black-
water PMCs were killed while on contract in Fallujah, Iraq. In March of 2004, Black-
water contractors were sent to escort a culinary convoy through the city of Fallujah 
during a tense period in the city’s diplomatic relations between the local Iraqis and 
American troops. Coalition forces were sent into Fallujah in an attempt to root out 
opposition forces that had developed a well-defended stronghold in the city. Ten-
sions continued to rise as coalition forces experienced little success at clearing Fallu-
jah (Scahill 114-124). Despite these conditions, Blackwater officials sent contractors 
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into the city without armoured vehicles or the use of rear gunners. Blackwater also 
failed to provide its contractors with equipment, such as maps of the city, which were 
essential for safe navigation. Without the protection of rear gunners, the convoy was 
attacked by an angry mob (presumably roused by militants) and quickly overrun. 
As a result, four PMCs were killed; their bodies were stripped of clothing, burned, 
and hung from a bridge. The city quickly devolved into a state of chaos and violence, 
the magnitude of which required United States forces in the area to engage in heavy 
street fighting (Parker, “What Exactly Happened”). 
  The families of the four contractors filed a lawsuit against Blackwater, stating 
that the company sent their employees into a dangerous situation with inadequate 
protection. While Blackwater Co. refused to provide the families of the victims with 
a detailed account of those events, the information that was released through the 
lawsuit demonstrated a lack of foresight and responsibility from Blackwater leaders 
(Neff, “Memos”). A congressional investigation agreed with the survivors of the at-
tack in Fallujah that Blackwater had ordered its employees into the city without the 
necessary military equipment. The investigation branded Blackwater as “unprepared 
and disorderly” (Dalesio, “Blackwater Suit Ends”).  In 2010-2011, seven years after 
the massacre, Blackwater was sold and the company rebranded itself as Academi Xe. 
The judge moved to dismiss the lawsuit because of the families’ lack of resources to 
fund their case. The lawsuit was then closed, thus ending any hope the victims’ fam-
ilies had for answers (Baker, “Blackwater Suit Tossed”). 
 These are only two of many cases in which a disregard for safety standards 
and negligence on behalf of private military companies has endangered the safety of 
contracted staff. Herein lies one of the most problematic issues with the introduction 
of contractors into combat roles: the lack of discipline. Michel Foucault refers to the 
military as part of what he calls ‘the disciplinary society.’ This type of society has com-
mon techniques for ensuring that power relationships properly functioned among 
their members, even in complex and demanding situations (Bogard 325-346). The 
lack of discipline, which is pragmatically necessary to organizations that operate un-
der complex power relationships and in stressful environments, can result in the de-
generation of the morality of war.
III. International Humanitarian Law and Private Military Contractors  
 The purpose of IHL is to safeguard those who would otherwise be left unpro-
tected in warfare. Since its inception, IHL has evolved to match prevailing military 
attitudes, new technologies, and gaps in law during times of war. The development of 
these principles and treaties is continuous process and remains far from perfect. At 
present, there are few Humanitarian Laws governing the actions of PMCs. Given the 
PEARSON
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aforementioned concerns with PMCs, it is essential that states collaborate to develop 
appropriate laws for companies who contravene existing regulations and codes of 
conduct. Human rights workers and legal experts must act within existing treaties 
and laws in order to protect civilians from the rampant abuses caused by the private 
military industry (Gomez del Prado, “Privatization of War”). Tracing these treaties 
and laws against questionable PMC activities will illustrate how some of the largest 
PMCs contracted by the United States have manipulated IHL in order to avoid pros-
ecution. 
 The first example of IHL relevant to the operations of PMCs is the St. Peters-
burg Declaration of 1868. The St. Petersburg Declaration was the first formal written 
declaration prohibiting the use of certain types of weapons during war. The weapon 
in question was a Russian munition that was invented in 1863. The Russian munition 
was designed to explode when it came into contact with a hard substance such as a 
wall or horse cart. The Russian shell’s tactical value was in the destruction of mu-
nitions wagons; after impact, the fracturing nature of the shell would subsequently 
destroy all other ordnance on the wagon. The munition was later modified to explode 
on contact with softer materials such as the human body. After informed of this, the 
Russian government sought to ban the weapon internationally. Any “civilized na-
tion” that wished to take part in the treaty was welcomed to prohibit what had been 
deemed an inhumane weapon of warfare (ICRC). That is, the St. Petersburg Decla-
ration of 1868 prohibited the use of weapons and projectiles that would cause un-
necessary human suffering. The 1868 Declaration’s mission was to set the “technical 
limits at which the necessity of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity” 
(ICRC). The St. Petersburg Declaration set the basis for IHL treaties and declarations 
that would soon follow.
 After two World Wars and several million casualties, the Geneva Conven-
tions were established. 1949 was the last year that the Geneva Conventions were re-
visited in their entirety; however, additional articles and three new protocols were 
added in 1977 and 2005. The Geneva Conventions recognised the fact that before 
1945, laws regarding warfare only applied to armed forces (specifically those who 
were able-bodied). Consequently, the Geneva Conventions were established to pro-
tect those who were not shielded under previous laws, such as wounded soldiers, 
prisoners of war, victims of shipwrecks, civilians, and other vulnerable persons. The 
document defines what comprises a ‘captured person’ and details the rights they have 
to proper treatment, medical aid, religious practices, and communication with their 
families (ICRC). The Geneva Conventions are vital to IHL, but article four is most 
applicable to PMCs. Article four of the Geneva Conventions “affords protection to 
civilians, even in occupied territory and defines what constitutes a civilian within 
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conflict” (ICRC). Article four is the first document that clearly defines and protects 
civilians within armed conflict. The document also defines categories of civilians in 
both belligerent states and occupied states. While 196 countries have ratified the Ge-
neva Conventions as of 2014, the treaty only binds nations who have signed it. That 
being said, several acts committed by PMCs clearly violate the Geneva Convention 
(ICRC, “Commentary”).
 The International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and 
Training of Mercenaries (ICRUFTM) was opened for ratification in 1989, but did not 
enter into force until 2001 (United Nations Human Rights). Only thirty-three states 
were party to the convention and of those a mere ten signed the original convention.3 
The 1989 Mercenary Convention defines a mercenary as any person who: 4 
 
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed con-
flict; (b) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for 
private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, 
material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to 
combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party; 
(c) Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory 
controlled by a party to the conflict; (d) Is not a member of the armed forces 
of a party to the conflict; and (e) Has not been sent by a State which is not a 
party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces. (United 
Nations Human Rights)
The ICRUFTM also bans a nation from hiring, recruiting, financially funding, and 
training mercenary forces (ICRC). While this document had little legal power at 
the time, it addressed a growing issue in warfare that has become a major concern. 
The fact that few countries signed the treaty speaks to the complex nature of ban-
ning PMCs. One of the most complicated aspects of attempting to gain support for 
this convention has to do with its implications for the United States; the ICRUFTM 
would effectively require the United States government to stop using one of its most 
powerful military tools – PMCs. 
 The United States government has gone to great lengths to keep PMCs op-
erating in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq during the early 2000s, Paul Bremer was an 
American diplomat in command of the Coalition Provisional Authority. Bremer 
3 State signatories to The 1989 ICRUFTMwere Angola, Congo, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Germany, Montenegro, Morocco, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, and Serbia.
4 While the ICRUFTM includes a more extensive definition of ‘mercenary’, the provided defini-
tion is sufficient for the purposes of this article. 
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often used Blackwater’s services for his personal protection while travelling through Iraq 
on diplomatic and military missions (Engelhart, “Order 17”). Before handing full con-
trol back to Iraqi authorities, Bremer and the United States government created Order 17, 
which effectively gave contractors diplomatic immunity from any kind of Iraqi prosecution 
(Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 17). This kind of immunity had severe 
repercussions for the Iraqi population. 
 On September 16, 2007, Blackwater Worldwide Co., a company who obtained one 
of the largest contracts during the Iraq war, was driving a convoy through the Iraqi city of 
Baghdad. Many civilian witnesses reported seeing Blackwater contractors fire what Black-
water would later claim were self-protecting ‘warning shots’ while city driving. If a civilian 
vehicle came too close to a Blackwater convoy, contractors would fire live rounds in front of 
the vehicle to get the driver to move. Blackwater guards claimed that these kinds of defen-
sive measures were used in an altercation in Nisour Square; the altercation with Blackwater 
guards led to the deaths of seventeen civilians and wounding of thirteen more (Scahill 
3-9). The contractors in question were quickly flown out of the country and protected 
from Iraqi courts under Paul Bremer’s Order 17. In a case launched in the Federal District 
Court, Blackwater guards, Paul Slough, Evan Liberty, Dustin Heard, and Nicholas Slatten, 
claimed that they acted in self-defence against a small car that allegedly opened fire on 
their convoy. However, there was no evidence at the crime scene, nor in witness statements 
that anyone in the square had fired at the contractors. Instead, witnesses claimed that the 
Blackwater convoy randomly fired their high-powered weapons at indiscriminate civilians 
without provocation. On October 22, 2014 all four Blackwater guards were found guilty, 
on three counts of voluntary manslaughter, one charge of murder, and numerous weapons 
infractions (Apuzzo, “Blackwater Guards Guilty”). 
 The Nisour Square incident is one example where PMCs have been brought to 
trial and convicted of criminal charges. For several years, there has been a sense of ambi-
guity among the American legal community about how PMCs guilty of infractions abroad 
should be tried for their crimes. In 2006, the U.S Congress amended article 2 (a) (10) of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) as an attempt to remedy the situation (Isenberg, 
“JAGs”). Under these modifications, civilian contractors working for the United States 
government would theoretically be subject to military law and the United States’ Court 
Marshall for overseas crimes. While changing the UCMJ appeared to achieve greater scope 
in terms of prosecuting PMCs, in reality the United States Armed Forces had little consti-
tutional authority to do so. There was a lack of legal precedent under the UCMJ of mili-
tary tribunals convicting civilian personnel for war crimes. When alterations to the UCMJ 
were proposed to Congress in 2006, there was very little debate or discussion. The lack of 
discussion was likely due to the known limits of the UCMJ’s jurisdictional authority. The 
proposed amendments may also have been seen as a political tactic to alleviate the fears of 
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the American public towards reckless PMC behaviour (Isenberg, “JAGs”). Civilian 
judges and the United States Supreme Court have listed strong objections to the con-
stitutional authority of American military tribunals to try civilians. Accordingly, few 
cases prosecuting civilian contractors, including the Nisour Square incident, have 
been brought before military courts since the enactment of the UCMJ. Therefore, the 
Nisour Square incident is a confirming instance of the lack of jurisdictional reach by 
the UCMJ (Isenberg, “JAGs”).  
 The Blackwater case in Nisour is just one example of how contractors have 
violated IHL by ignoring rights afforded in the Geneva Convention. PMCs have also 
violated IHL through the use of torture. In 2003 and 2004, PMCs directed and as-
sisted in torturing individuals at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, notably L-3 Com-
munications and Titan CACI (Gomez del Prado, “Privatization of War”). This too 
violates the Geneva Convention under the rights of ‘captured persons’ (ICRC). As 
previously discussed, Order 17 issued by Paul Bremer and the Provisional Authority 
provided immunity to all of these individuals from prosecution in Iraq. IHL needs 
to be strengthened in order to address legal loopholes that are currently exploited by 
contractors, their CEOs, and governments who employ PMCs  (Engelhart, “Order 
17”).  
IV. Conclusion   
 Although existing laws attempt to restrict the contracting of mercenaries in 
some ways, much still needs to be done. The ambiguous nature of the PMC indus-
try presents a challenge to IHL since it leaves the public largely uninformed and 
lawbreakers unaccountable (Kidane 361-365). Greater awareness and accountability 
from in-country contractors and the governments employing them is also needed. 
Moreover, the lack of military discipline within PMCs presents a serious question as 
to whether or not contractors are able to properly follow orders, impose restraint, and 
follow safety standards in combat. Finally, there remains the question of effectively 
implementing IHL. In particular, questionable relationships between the American 
government and contracting companies hired during the Iraq war, such as Blackwa-
ter Worldwide Co, have enabled PMCs to evade IHL (Engelhart, “Order 17”). 
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